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Two issues; the liberalisation of labour markets and monetary unification, have taken 
centre stage in policy debates on the future of the European Union. We show that both 
have the effect of raising capital mobility as well as labour-market flexibility. The 
reduction of exchange-rate fluctuations reduces the cost of both entering a market – by 
setting up companies and hiring new employees – as well as exiting by dismantling 
existing capital structures and firing employees. Thus the adoption of a single currency 
has effects very similar to the removal of employment-protection legislation and other 
direct restrictions on hiring and firing. The distinction between structural reforms in the 
labour market and monetary reforms may for this reason not be very helpful in finding 
the keys to higher employment growth in Europe. However, exchange-rate volatility is 
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Our evaluation is that at some point in time we will be enjoying a climate 
where there will be a stable currency. 
 
Carlos Ghosn, Nissan chief executive, announcing plans  
to build the new Micra small car in Britain rather than France. 
(Financial Times, 26 January 2001) 
 
I. Introduction  
 
State-mandated redundancy payments were introduced in many European countries from 
the late 1950s through to the early 1970s.
1,2 These firing restrictions have been blamed for 
the poor employment performance of many European countries (see for example Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988) and Lazear (1990)). The period since the first oil-price shock of 1973 
has been characterised by high levels of unemployment in European countries. In contrast, 
employment in the USA has been less protected by state regulation and US unemployment 
has been lower than in Europe since 1973.  
  A number of studies have attempted to estimate the extent to which employment-
protection provisions can account for European unemployment and unemployment 
persistence.
3 These studies generally find that firing costs reduce employment variability 
over the business cycle. There is less agreement on their effect on the average level of 
unemployment. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) use a theoretical model to show that due to 
time discounting the effect on the firing decision should be stronger than the effect on the 
hiring decision which makes firing costs have a positive impact on average unemployment. 
This prediction is however rejected in an empirical study by Lazear (1990) who finds an 
                                                           
1 In Britain, statutory redundancy pay was introduced with the passage of the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act, and 
re-enacted in the 1978 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act. 
2 Some hypotheses have been advanced that suggest an economic rationale for employment protection 
laws. For example, it has been suggested that firing costs reduce the problem of moral hazard associated 
with state unemployment benefit systems, since they prevent firms laying off workers too readily in order 
to take advantage of statutory unemployment insurance. Another hypothesis is that mandated firing costs 
give workers some bargaining power, and therefore redress the perceived imbalance between capital and 
labour (Buechtemann (1992)). Saint-Paul (1996) views the introduction of firing costs in terms of political 
economy, involving a redistribution between skilled and unskilled labour, or between employed and 
unemployed workers. Finally, Bentolila and Bertola (1990:399) suggest that, where demand fluctuations 
arise because of Keynesian coordination failures rather than through the operation of competitive markets, 
firing costs might improve workers' welfare due to an aggregate demand externalities. 
3 See inter alia Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Lazear (1990) and chapters in Buechtemann 
(1992)). See Burda (1992) for a search-theoretic model of firing costs. For a comparison between temporary 
labour contracts with no firing costs, and permanent contracts with firing costs, see Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(1992) and Bentolila and Dolado (1994). 
 1inverse relationship between employment and firing costs in a panel of OECD countries. 
Studies by Layard and Nickell (1999) and Scarpetta (1996) support these empirical results. 
Recent papers by Chen and Zoega (1999) and Chen, Snower and Zoega (2001) reconcile the 
theory with the evidence by showing explicitly how the effect of firing costs on average 
unemployment depends on the macroeconomic environment. In particular, low rates of 
growth of productivity and a high level of macroeconomic volatility can cause the effect on 
unemployment to become positive. For this reason, employment protection may have 
reduced average unemployment during Europe’s "golden age" – the 1950s and 1960s – 
while contributing to rising unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s. 
  Following in the footsteps of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), a comprehensive 
study by the OECD (Jobs Study, 1994) recommends that European labour markets be 
deregulated. Such regulations would involve a reduction in state-mandated redundancy 
payments, a reduced duration of unemployment benefits and an increase in active labour-
market expenditures.
4 A recent volume edited by Bertola et al. (2001) also finds a role for 
product-market deregulation. Importantly, countries with the most heavily regulated product 
markets also tend to have the most regulated labour markets so it is difficult to empirically 
distinguish between their effects on economic performance.  
 The  discussion  about  labour-market flexibility has taken place parallel to the debate, 
decision and introduction of a single currency in Europe. However, the effects of the 
deregulation of labour- and product markets and the choice of an exchange-rate regime have 
so far had the loosest of connections in policy debates. While there is a literature on the 
effects of monetary union on incentives for structural reforms, no analogy has been drawn 
between their respective effects on capital mobility, output and employment. The objective 
of this paper is to show that this presumption may not be accurate in that irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates – in the form of a single currency – facilitate the mobility of firms and 
labour-market flexibility in comparison with floating rates. We will show that the choice of 
an exchange rate regime has direct implications for hiring and firing – and by extension the 
                                                           
4 We should note that while there appears to be a consensus that deregulation may reduce structural 
unemployment, there is less consensus about the origins of high unemployment in Europe in the first place. 
Many of the institutions and legislation in effect today were also in effect before the advent of the high-
unemployment era and can be traced back to the late 1940, early 1950s in many cases. This brings us to the 
old question of why European unemployment was so low in the 1950s and 1960s and why the “rigid” 
labour markets performed so well then and, apparently, so badly today. 
 2entry and exit of firms – in the same way as does the regulation of labour and product 
markets.  
  Our analysis will show that volatile exchange rates reduce capital mobility and 
churning in the labour market and hence also any political pressure to protect workers 
from dismissals. In contrast, a single currency may raise capital mobility – by bringing 
more stable relative prices – and make it easier for firms to hire and fire workers. 
Increased unemployment fluctuations may then cause pressures for employment 
protection to build if there is increasing marginal disutility of unemployment in the minds 
of policy makers or labour-market participants (see Calmfors, 1998).  
  We will argue that macroeconomic factors – such as the choice between fixed and 
flexible exchange rates – should be included in any study of product and labour-market 
flexibility. If product- and labour-market regulations impair labour-market performance, the 
same may be said about a volatile macroeconomic environment. We start by reviewing the 
existing literature on the link between monetary union and labour-market reforms. 
 
II. Literature 
The unemployment problem in Europe is widely viewed as one of high structural
5 – as 
opposed to cyclical – unemployment (the Jobs Study, 1994). It is therefore important to 
know whether giving up monetary independence and/or increasing product-market 
competition is likely to lead to labour-market reforms that may reduce structural 
unemployment. 
At this stage there exist a number of conjectures about the likely effect of a monetary 
union on labour-market reforms and institutions. We divide these into two groups. First, 
the monetary regime may affect incentives to change legislation – such as the level and 
duration of benefits, eligibility criteria, and employment-protection legislation. Second, 
the behaviour of unions and employers may change following the loss of monetary 
independence. This is due to a possible change in the strategic behaviour of the three 
agents: unions, employers and central banks. According to Sibert and Sutherland (2000), 
the incentive for labour-market reform is likely to be reduced when monetary 
                                                           
5 Phelps (1994) was the first to use the expression structural unemployment to refer to a moving natural rate 
of unemployment.  
 3independence is lost. This occurs if the incentive to inflate is larger at higher rates of 
structural unemployment because voters do not differentiate between cyclical and 
structural unemployment. Hence the pressure to undertake fundamental labour-market 
reforms may be greater in countries that have their own monetary policy because such 
reforms are likely to reduce the temptation to inflate. In the European context, the 
pressure is reduced following the adoption of the single currency because the European 
central bank bases its decisions on the average of unemployment all member countries.
6 
In this way, high structural unemployment in one country imposes a negative externality 
on other countries in the form of an inflation bias.
 The externality arises because of the 
centralised nature of monetary policy and the decentralised nature of labour-market 
policy.
7 
  A similar argument can be applied to the behaviour of unions (Cukierman and Lippi; 
1997, 1999). A large and centralised labour union that dislikes inflation is likely to 
restrain its real-wage demands in order to keep unemployment down and hence reduce 
the incentive to inflate. In a monetary union, this tendency is reduced because the union 
now has less to fear from a central bank shared by many countries, which takes into 
account unemployment in all member countries. This is again an externality problem. A 
large union in any member country imposes a negative externality on other countries 
when its wage demands result in higher domestic unemployment. The externality is then 
felt in higher rates of inflation in the other countries. Similarly, there is an external 
benefit to wage moderation by a large, national union. 
  Yet another argument in the same direction is due to Lindbeck (1996) and Calmfors 
(2001) who emphasize the complementarity of labour-market reforms and monetary 
policy. Successful reforms lead to a fall in structural unemployment but actual 
unemployment only gradually converges to this new equilibrium. The speed of 
adjustment depends on the speed at which real wages can be reduced. This can come 
                                                           
6 The emphasis on inflation targeting by the European Central Bank strengthens this argument further. 
 
7 One argument for the adoption of a single currency is the elimination of exchange-rate spillovers in the 
form of beggar-thy-neighbour policies. Independent monetary policy is likely to have external effects on 
other countries in the union – expansionary monetary policy in one country raises (cyclical) unemployment 
in other countries. But we have seen that by giving up monetary independence there arises a different kind 
of an externality problem which reduces the incentive for labour-market reforms and wage moderation and 
hence acts to elevate structural unemployment throughout the continent. 
 4about through either a decline in nominal wages and/or an increase in the general price 
level. Of the two, an increase in the price level is likely to reduce real wages faster as 
resistance to nominal-wage cuts appears to be endemic in market economies, perhaps 
because of workers’ concern about relative wages or the lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). 
Because an independent monetary policy can be used to reduce real wages by raising the 
price level, countries having their own central bank may be more likely to embark on 
reforms. 
  The first counterargument is due to Calmfors (2001). He starts out by assuming that 
the business cycle could become more severe within the EMU due to the loss of 
monetary policy at the national level and incomplete price- and wage flexibility. With 
cyclical unemployment more volatile, pressures for reforms meant to reduce structural 
unemployment are likely to build if there is increasing marginal disutility of 
unemployment in the minds of policy makers. A higher variance of cyclical 
unemployment reduces expected utility in such a setting. In contrast, a reduction in 
average – or structural – unemployment raises expected utility for a given variance of 
cyclical unemployment. 
  Another counterargument involves product-market competition. With increased 
competition following the adoption of a single currency, a different kind of externality 
arises in the interaction of unions across countries. A large union in one country can, 
through wage moderation, induce companies to relocate from other countries and hence 
raise domestic employment at the expense of foreign employment. This leads over time 
to an outward shift of the domestic labour-demand schedule, which can later form the 
basis of wage demands. 
  From this we can conclude that it is entirely unclear whether the loss of monetary 
policy is more likely to increase or to decrease incentives for labour-market reforms or to 
make labour unions less militant. However, we will show that the effects of joining a 
single-currency area, on the one hand, and labour-market deregulation, on the other hand, 
share many similarities, which make the disctinction drawn between the two less 
important than one might think.  
 
 5III. Model  
We model the decision to set up (and later to discontinue) the operations of a firm that is 
wholly owned by domestic citizens and produces its (tradable) output at home for 
exports. The firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder value, which involves 
maximising the value of the firm in terms of domestic currency. 
We assume that the firm’s supply of output and the level of (foreign) demand 
determine the (foreign) price of output, while the domestic price is also a function of the 
level of the (nominal) exchange rate. The domestic price of output fluctuates with the 
exchange rate. While the costs of the firm are known with certainty – because labour is 
the only input – the price of its output is stochastic due to exchange-rate fluctuations. In 
particular, we assume that the exchange rate follows a Geometric Brownian motion.  
There are government regulations that stipulate the payment of redundancy payments 
in the event of layoffs. These payments are fixed and known a priori. Should the firm 
decide to move its operations to another country or to discontinue its operations, it faces a 
sunk cost of paying for the redundancy of all of its employees. There is also a direct cost 
of setting up operations that takes the form of a cost of hiring and training new workers. 
For these reasons, labour becomes a quasi-fixed factor of production, as first pointed out 
by Walter Oi (1962), and the hiring decision – as well as the layoff decision – becomes 
an intertemporal investment decision. Importantly, decisions to set up a new production 
unit or to discontinue existing ones amount to an intertemporal investment decision under 
uncertainty about the future level of exchange rates. 
We can use standard methods to calculate the effects of the exchange-rate volatility 
and the redundancy payments on the decision to set up a new firm – or a branch – and to 
discontinue the operation of existing ones. We assume that the production function is 
linear Q  where g denotes labour productivity, N is employment and Q output. 
There is a foreign demand function for the firms’s output, which gives output demanded 
as a negative function of the (foreign) price P
gN =
*,  ) 1 ( 1 * γ − − = ZP Q , where 0<γ<1 and Z 
denotes the level of demand. The production function and the demand function together 
give us an expression for the firm’s revenues in terms of foreign currency
f R , 
( )
γ γ gN Z R
f − =
1         0<γ<1.                                          (1) 
 6For simplicity, it is assumed that g and N are fixed and Z grows at a fixed rate of  Z η .  
Revenues in terms of domestic currency R, written as 
( )
γ γ gN EZ R
− =
1 ,           0<γ<1                                    (1') 
are stochastic due to the fluctuations of the exchange rate E, which follows a geometric 
Brownian motion; 
Edz Edt dE E σ η + = ,                                              (2) 
where z is a Wiener process;  dt ε = dz  since ε is a normally distributed random variable 
with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity;  E η  is the drift parameter and σ  the 
variance parameter. By Ito’s lemma, the stochastic differential equation for revenue, 
expressed in domestic currency, is represented by  
Rdz Rdt dR σ α + = ,                                                (3) 
where () Z E η µ η α − + = 1  is the trend growth rate.  
Current profits in domestic currency can then be written as 
C R − = Profits Current  ,                                           (4) 
where C denotes the fixed daily operative costs. It is assumed that the firm faces a fixed 
rate of death λ, which measures the probability that the firm goes out of business at each 
moment in time. Firms maximise shareholder value, which is equal to the expected 
discounted value of profits V. The Bellman equation follows; 
() () C R RV r V R V r R RR − + − + = + δ σ λ 2 2
2
1
,                          (5) 
where r is the risk-free rate of interest and δ = µ−α. The parameter δ derives from a no-
arbitrage condition and µ represents the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. 
  If there are no adjustment costs of entry (hiring), I, and/or exit (firing), E, each 
factory’s expected, present-discounted value of future profits, V
P, is represented by: 






V P                                                     (6) 
The meaning of the discount rate for revenues δ is straightforward: It is equal to the risk-
adjusted rate minus the expected growth rate, which is due to both the expected 
exchange-rate depreciation and demand growth. The daily operative cost is fixed and 
 7therefore its discount rate is only the risk-free rate. Note that V  is also a particular 
solution to the Bellman equation (5).  
P
  The option values (the value of the option to set up a new firm and the value of the 
option to discontinue the operations of an existing one) comes from the homogenous part 
of the Bellman equation (5): 
() () R RR RV r V R V r δ σ λ − + = + 2 2
2
1
                                     (7) 
The general (homogenous) solutions, V
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When R approaches zero, the value of the option to set up a new firm, V , should go to 





β R A V H
I = .                                                 (10.1) 






β R A V H
E = ,                                                 (10.2) 
which implies that no firm would close down a factory in a boom of that magnitude. 
  When the representative firm decides to hire workers to set up a new production 
facility it gains V
P and the option to discontinue its operations in the future, V , pays the 
training – or entry – costs I and sacrifices an option to enter later V . When, during an 
economic downturn, the firm then decides to close down its operations and fire 






P is then a negative number) and an option to re-
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λ δ E E R A R A .                                 (14) 
Equations (11), (12), (13) and (14) form a non-linear system of equations with four 
unknown parameters,  2 1   and     ,   , A A R R E I , and can be solved for numerically. 
 
IV. Exchange-rate volatility as employment protection 
We can now calculate the entry and exit thresholds for different values of the redundancy 
payments as well as the degree of exchange-rate uncertainty. We start by stating our 
benchmark values in Table 1. 
 
            Table 1. Benchmark values 
 
             γ        0.7            µ        0.08 
             ηE        0.0             r         0.05 
             σ        0.18             I        150 
             ηZ        0.03            E        100 




Figure 1 shows the entry thresholds for the exchange rate implied by equations (11)-(14) 
and Figure 2 the exit thresholds. The exchange rate has to exceed the entry threshold for a 
new firm to be set up and it has to become lower than the exit threshold for an existing 
firm to leave. We first turn to the former and note that the effective cost of hiring includes 
 9the direct hiring- and training costs as well as the expected firing costs (or redundancy 
payments).  
The entry threshold is strongly rising in the level of exchange-rate volatility. 
Intuitively, the greater is the level of uncertainty about the future value of the exchange 
rate, the more valuable is the option to enter, which – according to equation (11) – gets 
sacrificed when the firm is set up. The threshold is also rising in the level of the firing 
costs. However, note that firing costs only matter at high levels of volatility. When there 
is little uncertainty, the representative firm does not have to fear a future dismissal of 
those it is currently hiring. For this reason, the expected firing costs become less 
important. We thus find that both increased exchange-rate volatility as well as higher 
firing costs raise the exchange-rate threshold at which the representative firm starts to 
hire new workers. However, the effect of volatility is more robust because redundancy 























Figure 1. The effect of exit costs on the entry thresholds with different values 
of σ. Other parameters: γ= 0.7, ηZ=0.02, ηE=0.0, µ=0.08, r =0.05, I = 150, C = 
75, λ = 0.05. 
 
The firing threshold shows the critical level of the exchange rate at which firms start to 
fire. It is downward sloping in both the level of the firing costs and the level of 
uncertainty. This implies that if either assumes a higher value, the exchange rate has to 
 10fall to a lower level for the marginal workers to be fired. The effect of the redundancy 
payments now no longer depends on the level of exchange-rate volatility. We thus find 
that both increased volatility as well as higher firing costs deter the firing of workers and 
























Figure 2. The effect of exit (firing) costs on the exit thresholds with different 
values of sigma, σ. Other parameters: γ= 0.7, ηZ=0.03, ηE=0.0, µ=0.08, r =0.05, 
I = 150, C = 75, λ = 0.05. 
 
 
We can clarify the effect of exchange-rate uncertainty and firing costs on the entry- 
and exit thresholds further by plotting iso-protection curves that show all the 
combinations of volatility and firing costs that yield the same effect on the entry and exit 
decision respectively. Figure 3 below shows the iso-protection curves for the entry 
decision and Figure 4 the iso-protection curve for the exit decision. Note that the former 
are much flatter than the latter and that the iso-protection curves for the entry decision 
become steeper for higher levels of the entry threshold – that is the one that corresponds 



































Entry thresholds = 140
Entry thresholds =130
Entry thresholds = 120
 
Figure 3. Iso-protection curves for the entry decision. Other parameters: γ= 0.7, 




































Exit thresholds = 50
Exit thresholds = 45
 
Figure 4. Iso-protection curves for the exit decision. Other parameters: γ= 0.7, 
ηZ=0.03, ηE=0.0, µ=0.08, r =0.05, I = 150, C = 75, λ = 0.05. 
 12V. Industrial policies, volatility and firing costs  
Suppose that the home government subsidises domestic firms by paying a subsidy (S) to 
offset any competitive advantage of a foreign rival in terms of firing costs or exchange-
rate volatility
8. In particular, assume that both are fixed and given for the foreign country, 
and that the domestic government wants to make the exit threshold faced by domestic 
firms identical to that faced by its foreign rivals. We can now calculate the level of the 
required domestic subsidy as a function of the volatility and firing-cost differential 
between the two countries.  
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− − .                             (12') 
The only difference between the domestic and the foreign firm is – apart from the subsidy 
– the differential exit costs or firing costs and the differential risk (due to a different 
exchange-rate regime). As shown in Figure 5, the higher is the level of foreign firing 
costs relative to domestic firing costs, and the greater is the volatility of the foreign 
currency relative to the volatility of the domestic currency, the higher is the government 
subsidy that is needed to achieve the same exit threshold at home. Note that an increase 




                                                           
8 Note that if the foreign firm is located in the country importing our output, its exchange-rate uncertainty is 
equal to zero because it is producing for its home market. 
 
9 For example, if the risk effect is the same and the exit costs are £100million only, the domestic 
government needs to pay up to £20million (= (r+λ)∆E = 0.1×£200m) to keep the local factory alive. 







































Figure 5. The effect of domestic firing costs (E) and volatility (σ) on the 
required subsidy. Note that for the foreign country, σ*=0.08 and E*=300. For 
other parameters, see Figure 1.  
 
These results demonstrate that the volatility of floating exchange rates may save 
domestic branches from being closed. A floating exchange-rate regime thus has an effect 
on the decisions of firms contemplating exiting the home country that is similar to the 
effect of direct employment protection in the form of firing costs. However, this same 
volatility will prevent other firms from being set up due to the higher level of the entry 
threshold.  
 
VI. Comparing volatility and firing costs 
We have shown that the labour market can be made more flexible through both 
liberalisation – the dismantling of employment-protection legislation and the lowering of 
firing costs – and by an emphasis on exchange-rate stability – which we have taken to be 
synonymous to the adoption of a single currency. What remains is to look at the effect of 
these two measures in specific situations.  
Assume that we would like to protect employment in a declining industry. Is it then 
better to impose explicit firing costs or do we opt for increased exchange-rate volatility? 
 14Do the two measures have a different effect on the entry of firms in any expanding 
industry? An important question is whether volatility or firing costs fares better when it 
comes to not discouraging entrepreneurs too much from setting up promising new 
companies.  
Let’s start by assuming that we want to reduce the rate of job loss in a domestic 
industry that faces declining demand. We would expect that increasing labour-market 
flexibility by reducing firing costs would accelerate the decline. The question arises 
whether joining a single currency would also have the same effect. Figures 6 and 7 
confirm this presumption. However, when comparing the left-hand-side panels we see 
that volatility would have a particularly bad effect on the entry of promising – high-
growth – industries. While, in the case of firing costs, the entry threshold is significantly 
steeper for industries with a negative growth rate compared to those with a positive 
growth rate, the difference is much smaller in the case of volatility. The effect of 
exchange-rate volatility is thus to deter the entry of promising high-growth industries and 
to slow down the dismantling of declining ones. We conclude on this count that firing 
costs may be preferable because they accomplish the latter without causing the former to 

































































































Figure 6. The effect of exit costs on the entry/exit thresholds with different 
values of demand growth rate ηZ. Other parameters: γ=0.7, σ =0.18, ηE=0.0, 
















































































































Figure 7. The effect of sigma σ on the entry/exit thresholds with different 
values of demand growth rate ηZ. Other parameters: γ =0.7, σ = 0.18, ηE = 0.0, 




We can summarise our conclusions as follows. 
 
•  Exchange-rate volatility raises both the costs of setting up a new firm as well as 
discontinuing the operations of existing ones in a way similar to employment-
protection legislation in the form of firing costs. 
•  In comparison to firing costs, exchange-rate volatility is more damaging to entry and 
equally beneficial for exit. In particular, exchange-rate volatility as a form of 
employment protection is particularly bad for the entry of promising new industries. 
•  The negative effect of firing costs on firm entry and the hiring of new workers is 
declining in the stability of exchange rates. Thus firing costs affect primarily the 
firing decision, and not the hiring decision, in a stable macroeconomic environment.  
 
We conclude that given the choice between these two forms of employment protection, 
direct legislation in the form of state-mandated redundancy payments is preferable to a 
floating and volatile exchange rate. Moreover, the reduction of volatility – for example 
following the adoption of a single currency – will reduce any adverse effects of firing 
costs. 
 16  These results cast light on the current debate in the United Kingdom. Those who go 
under the label Eurosceptics tend to prefer the liberalisation of labour markets but not the 
adoption of the European single currency. If the only concern is labour-market flexibility, 
the two views appear to be contradictory in light of our analysis. Both employment-
protection legislation as well as a floating exchange rate regime – with the accompanying 
exchange-rate volatility – deter both the entry and exit of firms with the adverse effects 
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